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RECENT CASES
Constitutional Law-Criminal
Procedure-Courts Split on the Necessity of
Separate Authorization for a Covert Entry Under
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968
I. INTRODUCTION
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
1968,' which regulates the use of electronic surveillance,2 was de-
signed to protect "the privacy of wire and oral communications,"
and to delineate "on a uniform basis the circumstances and condi-
tions under which the interception of wire and oral communications
may be authorized."' In general, communications may be inter-
cepted only by law enforcement officers,4 who are engaged in the
investigation of a certain type of crime,5 and who have obtained a
court order based upon probable cause that authorizes the use of
electronic surveillance.6 Although certain details of the particular
interception must be specified in the court order,7 the statute does
1. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1976). For an extensive treatment of Title III, see J. CARR,
THE LAW OF ELECTRONIC SURVELLANCE (1977).
2. Electronic surveillance includes both "wiretapping" and "eavesdropping" or
"bugging." Wiretapping is the interception of telephonic conversations; eavesdropping or
bugging is the interception of conversations not transmitted by wire. 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (1976);
57 B.U. L. REv. 587 & n.1 (1977).
3. S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 66, reprinted in [19681 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 2112, 2153. Moreover, "the major purpose of title III is to combat organized crime."
Id. at 70, [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 2157.
4. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(a) (1976). A definition of an "investigative or law enforcement
officer" is given at 18 U.S.C. § 2510(7):
"Investigative or law enforcement officer" means any officer of the United States
or of a State or political subdivision thereof, who is empowered by law to conduct
investigations of or to make arrests for offenses enumerated in this chapter, and any
attorney authorized by law to prosecute or participate in the prosecution of such offen-
ses.
Exceptions from the requirement that the interception be made by a law enforcement officer
can be found at 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)-(3) (1976).
5. 18 U.S.C. § 2516 (1976).
6. 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (1976).
7. The necessary elements of the court order are:
(a) the identity of the person, if known, whose communications are to be inter-
cepted;
(b) the nature and location of the communications facilities as to which, or the
place where, authority to intercept is granted;
(c) a particular description of the type of communication sought to be intercepted,
and a statement of the particular offense to which it relates;
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not expressly require that the judge who authorizes the use of elec-
tronic surveillance also authorize covert entries that may be re-
quired to place the electronic listening devices Until recently the
federal courts apparently had assumed that an order authorizing the
use of electronic surveillance implicitly authorized a surreptitious
entry by law enforcement officials to install the necessary device.
In United States v. Ford,"0 however, the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit became the first federal court of appeals to reject this assump-
tion, holding that absent express judicial authorization, a trespas-
sory entry incident to the placement of an electronic listening device
is an invasion of privacy that violates the fourth amendment. The
Second Circuit subsequently disagreed in United States v. Scafidi,"
holding that authorization of electronic surveillance renders unnec-
essary explicit authorization of a covert entry incident to the inter-
ception. Analysis of these two decisions requires an examination of
prior judicial reasoning that recognized the applicability of fourth
amendment principles to the interception of oral communications,
defined the limits these principles place on the use of electronic
surveillance, and led to the passage of Title III.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
In Olmstead v. United States"2 the Supreme Court for the first
time addressed the issue whether an interception of oral communi-
cations through electronic surveillance triggers fourth amendment
protection. 3 Reading the fourth amendment literally,'4 the Court
(d) the identity of the agency authorized to intercept the communications, and of
the person authorizing the application; and
(e) the period of time during which such interception is authorized, including a
statement as to whether or not the interception shall automatically terminate when the
described communication has first been obtained.
18 U.S.C. § 2518(4) (1976).
8. E.g., United States v. Dalia, 426 F. Supp. 862, 865 (D.N.J. 1977).
9. See United States v. Scafidi, 564 F.2d 633, 639 (2d Cir. 1977).
10. 553 F.2d 146 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
11. 564 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1977).
12. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
13. The petitioners had operated a large scale business based on illegal importation,
possession, and sale of liquor. They were convicted of conspiracy to violate the National
Prohibition Act after federal officers gained incriminating evidence from several wiretaps.
Certiorari was granted with "the distinct limitation that the hearings should be confined to
the single question whether the use of evidence of private telephone conversations between
the defendants and others, intercepted by means of wire tapping, amounted to a violation of
the Fourth and Fifth Amendments." Id. at 455. The Court, however, later noted that because
the fifth amendment was inapplicable in this case absent a violation of the fourth amend-
ment, the sole consideration of the Court would be whether the government had violated the
fourth amendment. Id. at 462.
14. The fourth amendment provides:
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held that wiretaps made without trespass upon the defendant's
property did not violate the Constitution because the government
had neither seized tangible materials nor engaged in a physical
intrusion.5 Olmstead thus limited the protection of the fourth
amendment to physical things and physical areas."6 In essence, the
Olmstead doctrine contained two prongs: (1) only material things
are protected from seizure within the meaning of the fourth amend-
ment, and (2) a physical trespass is required for an interception of
conversations to violate the fourth amendment.'7 In Goldman v.
United States,1 the Court extended the applicability of the
Olmstead doctrine beyond wiretaps to all cases of electronic surveil-
lance."'
The first prong of the Olmstead doctrine was undermined in
Silverman v. United States.20 In Silverman, police officers recorded
incriminating conversations by pushing an electronic listening de-
vice through the party wall of an adjoining house until it touched
the heating ducts in the defendants' house. The Court held that the
testimony of police officers describing the conversations had been
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The court refused to enlarge the scope of fourth amendment protec-
tion beyond that provided by a strict construction of the constitutional language. See 277 U.S.
at 464-66.
15. The Court held that wiretapping did not amount to a search or seizure within the
meaning of the fourth amendment "unless there has been an official search and seizure of
his person, or such a seizure of his papers or his tangible material effects, or an actual physical
invasion of his house 'or curtilage' for the purpose of making a seizure." Id. at 466.
16. Although Olmstead did not use the term "constitutionally protected area," infra
text accompanying note 22, implicit in its stress upon an actual physical invasion is a finding
that the fourth amendment protects, in addition to material things, only certain defined
areas.
17. The two-pronged Olmstead doctrine has been discussed by numerous commenta-
tors. E.g., Decker & Handler, Electronic Surveillance: Standards, Restrictions and Remedies,
12 CAL. W.L. Rv. 60, 62 (1975); Scoular, Wiretapping and Eavesdropping Constitutional
Development from Olmstead to Katz, 12 ST. Louis U.L.J. 513, 516 (1968).
18. 316 U.S. 129 (1942).
19. Petitioners were convicted of conspiracy to violate § 29(b)(5) of the Bankruptcy Act
after federal agents intercepted incriminating evidence by means of a detectaphone placed
against the wall of a room adjoining the office of one of the petitioners. The agents had
committed a prior trespass to install a listening device, but the device malfunctioned. The
Court thus concluded that the trespass was irrelevant to the evidence later obtained by the
detectaphone. Since there was no trespass related to the intercepted conversations, the Court,
expressly refusing to distinguish Goldman from Olmstead on the basis of a difference between
eavesdropping and wiretapping, held that the trial court had correctly admitted the govern-
ment's evidence. Id. at 134-35.
20. 365 U.S. 505 (1961). The crimes involved in Silverman were gambling offenses under
the District of Columbia Code.
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erroneously admitted and set aside the convictions. Although it
disclaimed the technicality of a trespass as a basis for its holding,'
the Court stressed that the officers' activity constituted an unau-
thorized physical penetration into a "constitutionally protected
area."22 Implicit in Silverman's ruling was an assumption that sur-
veillance of oral communications alone might trigger fourth amend-
ment protection. 23 Two years later in Wong Sun v. United States, 24
the Court expressly held that conversations might be protected by
the fourth amendment, but it limited the scope of that protection
to instances of unlawful entry.25
By deemphasizing the importance of a trespass to invoke fourth
amendment protection for oral statements, Silverman also weak-
ened the validity of the second prong of the Olmstead doctrine,
which demanded a trespass incident to electronic surveillance as a
prerequisite to constitutional protection. The Court expressly over-
ruled the trespass prong in Katz v. United States, 8 concluding that
because "the Fourth Amendment protects people-and not simply
'areas'-against unreasonable searches and seizures," a physical
21. The Court stated:
A distinction between the detectaphone employed in Goldman and the spike mike uti-
lized here seemed to the Court of Appeals too fine a one to draw. The court was
"unwilling to believe that the respective rights are to be measured in fractions of inches."
But decision here does not turn upon the technicality of a trespass upon a party wall as
a matter of local law. It is based upon the reality of an actual intrusion into a constitu-
tionally protected area.
Id. at 512.
22. Id.; see note 16 supra and accompanying text.
23. Although there was a physical intrusion, the Court's uneasiness with the trespass
requirement indicates that the focus of the constitutional protection may have been the
conversations.
24. 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
25. Petitioners in Wong Sun were convicted of fraudulent and knowing transportation
and concealment of illegally imported heroin. One item of evidence was an incriminating oral
statement made by one of the petitioners to federal officers who had illegally entered the
petitioner's business establishment. The Court held that the exclusionary rule barred this
verbal evidence. It stated:
It follows from our holding in Silverman v. United States that the Fourth Amendment
may protect against the overhearing of verbal statements as well as against the more
traditional seizure of "papers and effects." . . . Thus, verbal evidence which derives so
immediately from an unlawful entry and an unauthorized arrest as the officers' action
in the present case is no less the "fruit" of official illegality than the more common
tangible fruits of the unwarranted intrusion.
Id. at 485-86 (citations omitted).
26. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). Petitioner was indicted for transmitting gambling information
across state lines. At trial, the government introduced evidence of telephone conversations
obtained by FBI agents who had attached an electronic listening and recording device to the
outside of a telephone booth from which petitioner placed calls. After his conviction, peti-
tioner challenged the constitutionality of the government's action in intercepting his conver-
sations.
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intrusion is not necessary to trigger constitutional protection for oral
communications.2 Katz thus rendered obsolete the traditional defi-
nition of a fourth amendment search as an intrusion into a
"constitutionally protected area,""8 indicating that the fourth
amendment protects against invasions of any privacy interest upon
which an individual justifiably has relied. 9
Because the Court has established that electronic surveillance
triggers fourth amendment protection, an oral interception clearly
must meet the same constitutional requirements imposed on all
searches, including those searches requiring a physical entry to seize
tangible evidence. In general, the government may only conduct
searches to seize evidence pursuant to judicially issued warrants. 30
This requirement was applied in Katz, in which the Court empha-
sized the crucial importance of obtaining prior judicial authoriza-
tion of electronic surveillance operations, noting that in its absence
the discretion of the police is the sole protection against fourth
amendment violations.3 1 Under the "plain view" doctrine, formu-
lated in Coolidge v. New Hampshire,3" however, evidence may be
seized without a warrant if it is discovered inadvertently in the
process of a justifiable intrusion and if it is immediately apparent
that the evidence is incriminating.3 3 Additionally, a search warrant
must particularly describe the place to be searched and the persons
or things to be seized;34 general warrants are constitutionally imper-
missible.3 The Court expressly held the particularity requirement
27. Id. at 353.
28. The Court stated that "the correct solution of Fourth Amendment problems is not
necessarily promoted by incantation of the phrase 'constitutionally protected area.'" Id. at
350; see notes 16 & 22 supra and accompanying text.
29. The Court found that "[t]he Government's activities in electronically listening to
and recording the petitioner's words violated the privacy upon which he justifiably relied
while using the telephone booth and thus constituted a 'search and seizure' within the mean-
ing of the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 353.
30. In Katz, the Court noted that "[s]earches conducted outside the judicial process,
without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment-subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions."
Id. at 357.
31. Id, at 358-59.
32. 403 U.S. 443 (1971). Petitioner in Coolidge had been convicted of murder. At trial,
the government introduced evidence obtained during a search made pursuant to a warrant
issued by the state attorney general, who had been in charge of the investigation and was
chief prosecutor at trial. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction, holding the search
warrant invalid.
33. Id. at 465-66.
34. The fourth amendment provides that "no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized." U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV.
35. General warrants were so offensive to the American colonists that their use was a
factor in the writing of the Declaration of Independence. See Berger v. New York, 388 U.S.
41, 58 (1967).
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applicable to authorizations of electronic surveillance in Berger v.
New York, 31 which marked the Court's first attempt to describe the
requisite characteristics of constitutionally permissible eavesdrop-
ping. 7 Indeed, the Court noted that while particularity is required
whenever a fourth amendment intrusion is authorized, it is espe-
cially important in warrants authorizing the use of electronic sur-
veillance because of the extreme intrusion on privacy inherent in
eavesdropping.35 Consequently, the Court mandated that such in-
trusions be minimized to the greatest extent possible.39 The Berger
Court also stressed the importance of having a neutral authority
authorize the interception. 0
In response to the requirements established in Berger and Katz,
Congress enacted Title Ill of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968.41 Although Title Ill requires a court order to
effect investigative electronic surveillance, its silence on the ques-
tion of express judicial authorization to make covert entries incident
to the surveillance has produced the conflicting results in Ford and
Scafidi.
III. THE INSTANT OPINIONS
In Ford the government intercepted incriminating oral commu-
nications using electronic listening devices planted by means of a
bomb scare ruse in the place of business of one of the defendants.2
36. 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
37. Petitioner, acting as a "go-between" for the principal conspirators, was convicted
of conspiracy to bribe the chairman of the New York State Liquor Authority in return for
the awarding of liquor licenses to the Playboy and Tenement Clubs in New York City. Over
the petitioner's objection, the state produced evidence at trial that had been obtained through
judicially authorized electronic surveillance. The issue before the Supreme Court was the
validity of New York's eavesdrop statute. The Court concluded that the statute was too
broad, thus violating the fourth and fourteenth amendments. Among the defects that the
Court found in the statute were the following: (1) a lack of required particularity in the
warrant as to the crime involved and the conversations to be recorded, (2) the extremely long
period of surveillance permitted under a single warrant, (3) the issuance of extensions without
new showings of probable cause, (4) the lack of a termination date on the eavesdrop once the
desired conversation was intercepted, (5) the permission to make unconsented entries without
the requirement of a showing of exigent circumstances, and (6) the absence of a requirement
of a return on the warrant. Id. at 55-60.
38. Id. at 56.
39. Id. at 59-60.
40. Id. at 54.
41. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1976).
42. Members of the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department effected the
surveillance at the Meljerveen Ltd. Shoe Circus, a suspected site of narcotics activity. Two
bomb scare ruses were employed since the listening devices installed in the first attempt
malfunctioned. All defendants were indicted for conspiracy to distribute and possess with
intent to distribute narcotic drugs in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1970). Two of the defen-
dants were charged with distributing a controlled substance in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)
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Although the intercept order authorized both the use of electronic
surveillance and any manner of entry to effect the interception,43 the
defendants moved to suppress the evidence, claiming that the order
was overly broad. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit affirmed the lower court's order to suppress the evidence"l
and held that a nonconsensual, surreptitious entry 5 made in
connection with electronic surveillance requires particularized judi-
cial authorization that is distinct from the authorization of the
eavesdrop itself.48
In reaching its conclusion, the court first noted that the govern-
ment's action implicated two distinct fourth amendment guaran-
tees-protection from unconsented physical entry into private
premises and from unauthorized interceptions of oral statements. 47
The court found that although Katz had held that a physical tres-
pass is not a prerequisite to fourth amendment protection for oral
communications,48 it did not render the safeguards of the fourth
amendment inapplicable to a physical intrusion.48 Katz thus ex-
panded, rather than diminished the protection of the fourth amend-
ment.5 0 Consequently the court rejected the government's conten-
(1970). One defendant was charged with possession of a narcotic drug in violation of 33 D.C.
Code § 402 (1973). 553 F.2d at 150 & n.14.
43. The order read in part:
(d) Members of the Metropolitan Police Department are hereby authorized to enter
and re-enter the Meljerveen Ltd. Shoe Circus located at 4815 Georgia Avenue, North-
west, Washington, D.C., for the purpose of installing, maintaining, and removing the
electronic eavesdropping devices. Entry and re-entry may be accomplished in any man-
ner, including, but not limited to, breaking and entering or other surreptitious entry, or
entry and re-entry by ruse and strategem.
553 F.2d at 149-50 (emphasis supplied by court). The intercept order was made pursuant to
the D.C. Code provisions that deal with electronic surveillance. Since these provisions
"track" the provisions of Title III, however, id. at 148 n.4, the decision in Ford is directly
applicable to the discussion of Title III in this Comment.
44. The District Court for the District of Columbia accepted as true the government
contention that the judge who authorized the surveillance knew of and approved in advance
the bomb scare ruses. Since there was no formal record of judicial approval, however, the
court limited its scrutiny to the face of the warrant, which it found overly broad because it
failed to limit the number of entries and failed to specify the time and manner of entry to be
used in effecting the surveillance. United States v. Ford, 414 F. Supp. 879, 884 (D.D.C. 1976).
45. The court stated that "[bly surreptitious entry we mean either entry by ruse or
strategem or covert entry." 553 F.2d at 154 n.32.
46. Id. at 154-55.
47. Id. at 152-53. The dual fourth amendment interests inherent in electronic surveil-
lance effected by a trespassory installation of listening devices was also recognized in United
States v. Agrusa, 541 F.2d 690, 696 (8th Cir. 1976). See note 65 infra.
48. See notes 26-29 supra and accompanying text.
49. 553 F.2d at 157-58. The court also rejected the contention that Berger eliminated
fourth amendment protection for covert entries incident to electronic surveillance, concluding
that it merely extended particularity requirements to eavesdropping. Id. at 157.
50. Id.
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tion that a covert entry incident to electronic surveillance is not
independently within the fourth amendment's protection. The court
also rejected the government's argument that even if incidental cov-
ert entries are within the protection of the fourth amendment, a
valid Title III order makes intrusions on physical privacy per se
reasonable and thus vitiates the need for express authorization to
make a surreptitious entry.5 1 Noting the general rule that a warrant
must be obtained before a fourth amendment privacy interest is
invaded,5" the court concluded that no exception to the warrant
requirement should be created for covert entries incident to elec-
tronic surveillance. In this regard the court rejected the govern-
ment's contention that courts do not have the necessary expertise
to specify the manner of entry required to plant listening devices,
finding it untenable in light of the function the judiciary plays in
determining the reasonableness of police actions. 4 Moreover, the
court characterized the government's argument that any additional
invasion of privacy resulting from a covert entry is minor in view of
the invasion resulting from the surveillance itself" as inconsistent
with the fourth amendment." Having concluded that the fourth
amendment indeed mandates prior judicial authorization of a cov-
ert entry incident to electronic surveillance,57 the court found the
intercept order at issue overly broad,5" declaring that under the
principle established in Berger and codified in Title Ill, the showing
of probable cause must fully correspond to the intrusion authorized,
and that the police failed to demonstrate a need for the vast discre-
tion afforded them by the warrant."
In Scafidi FBI agents, operating pursuant to a Title III inter-
51. The second contention raised by the government is essentially the same proposition
enunciated in United States v. Altese, No. 75-341 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 14, 1976) and United States
v. Dalia, 426 F. Supp. 862 (D.N.J. 1977) in finding authorization for a covert entry implicit
in the authorization to use electronic surveillance.
52. 553 F.2d at 160 n.47, 160-62; see note 30 supra and accompanying text.
53. 553 F.2d at 162-63. The court found that "the only rationale for creating a categori-
cal exemption from the warrant requirement ... would be the convenience of the executing
officers." Id. at 163.
54. The court stated that such a contention "would lead not only to abrogation of the
warrant requirement, but also to the unacceptable conclusion that courts are inherently
incapable of reviewing the reasonableness of police action taken with the intent to install or
maintain eavesdropping devices." Id. at 162.
55. Id.
56. Quoting from Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 764-65 (1969), the court concluded
that this argument "is founded on little more than a subjective view regarding the acceptabil-
ity of certain sorts of police conduct, and not on considerations relevant to Fourth Amend-
ment interests." 553 F.2d at 162.
57. 553 F.2d at 164-65; see text accompanying note 46 supra.
58. 553 F.2d at 170.
59. Id. at 167-68.
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cept order that lacked both specific authorization for covert entries
and a statement of the manner of entry to be used, 0 placed listening
devices at premises used by the defendants for alleged criminal
activities.6 ' After their convictions, nine defendants appealed,
claiming that the government had acted without authority in mak-
ing surreptitious entries incident to the surveillance. 2 The Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld the convictions, ruling that
an intercept order authorizing the installation of a listening device
in particular premises obviates the need for separate authorization
of a covert entry to install the device. 3
In support of its conclusion the court first noted that in enact-
ing Title III, Congress clearly intended the use of surreptitious en-
tries in certain instances. 4 Although recognizing the split in the
federal courts as to the necessity of specific judicial authorization
of entries incident to authorized surveillance, 5 the court concluded
that in order to be effective, an intercept order necessarily grants
implicit authority to make whatever reasonable entries are required
60. 564 F.2d at 639.
61. The defendants were operating a numbers lottery in Brooklyn during three different
time periods at three separate locations. Evidence was obtained at two of these sites by
electronic surveillance. Twenty defendants were tried together on four counts, but only nine
were convicted, all for operating illegal gambling businesses, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1955
(1976).
62. Defendants made other claims on appeal, including insufficiency of affidavits un-
derlying the intercept order. 564"F.2d at 638-42.
63. Id. at 640.
64. Id. at 639.
65. Id. In addition to the cases cited, consider United States v. Agrusa, 541 F.2d 690
(8th Cir. 1976), United States v. Volpe, 430 F. Supp. 931 (D. Conn. 1977), and In re United
States, 563 F.2d 637 (4th Cir. 1977). In Agrusa, the Title I warrant expressly authorized
surreptitious entries, although the breadth of the authorization was similar to that found
fatally defective in Ford. 541 F.2d at 693. The court affirmed the defendant's conviction,
declining to decide what resolution it would reach if express approval of covert entries had
not been given. It stated, however, that a lack of express authorization would have made its
decision more difficult. Id. at 696. A recent comment onAgrusa finds prior judicial authoriza-
tion of surreptitious entries incident to electronic surveillance necessary. 57 B.U. L. REv. 587
(1977). It states:
Contrary to the conclusion in Agrusa, the addition of the element of a forcible entry to
effect an electronic surveillance is not merely "one of degree." A forcible entry to install
a bug substantively changes the nature of the search because it constitutes a more
significant privacy intrusion than does a nontrespassory method of interception, such
as a wiretap. This difference rises to a constitutional level and requires that a magistrate
determine whether a nontrespassory method of surveillance is available before authoriz-
ing surreptitious entry to install a bug.
Id. at 599. The comment notes that a forcible entry adds to the intrusiveness of eavesdropping
by creating a potential for police abuse through both rummaging and pretextual searches
associated with the plain view doctrine, by offending society's sense of security, and by
allowing the government to engage in eavesdropping. Id. at 600-05. In re United States, the
only other circuit court decision besides Ford and Scafidi to squarely confront the issue of
separate authorization, takes a position similar to that in Ford.
1978l 1063
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to effect the interception." The court also found significant the
failure of Congress to provide in Title III, in general a highly de-
tailed statute, a requirement of separate authorization for a covert
entry. 7 Additionally, the court pointed out that because courts lack
the requisite familiarity with both the installation of listening de-
vices and the premises under surveillance,68 a judge who explicitly
authorizes the manner and place of installation might be forced to
visit the premises. The court also noted that if the directions con-
tained in the intercept order were extremely detailed, unforeseen
deviations due to emergencies might render the actions of the exe-
cuting officers illegal." The court thus determined that judges
should leave the manner of execution of an intercept order to the
discretion of law enforcement agencies, whose competence in the
area of electronic surveillance exceeds that of the judiciary. °
66. The court stated that:
[Tihe most reasonable interpretation of the orders in this case, granting authorization
to bug private premises, is that they implied approval for secret entry. Indeed, any order
approving electronic surveillance of conversations to be overheard at a particular private
place, must, to be effective, carry its own authority to make such reasonable entry as
may be necessary to effect the "seizure" of the conversations.
564 F.2d at 639-40; see note 51 supra and accompanying text.
67. 564 F.2d at 640.
68. The expertise argument also was made in Ford. See note 54 supra and accompany-
ing text.
69. 564 F.2d at 640.
70. Id. Judge Gurfein concurred with the opinion of the court written by Judge Moore.
He observed that Title III requires not that a warrant specify the manner of effecting the
placement of a listening device, but rather that it include "a particular description of the
place where the communication is to be intercepted." Id. at 643. Moreover, he found signifi-
cant a 1970 amendment to Title IMl, Pub. L. No. 91-358, § 211(b), 84 Stat. 654 (amending 18
U.S.C. § 2518(4)), which allows the order authorizing electronic surveillance to direct "a
communication carrier, landlord, custodian or other person. . .to furnish. . . all informa-
tion, facilities, and technical assistance necessary to accomplish the interception unobtru-
sively." He observed that "[w]ith its [Congress'] attention having been called to the need
for doing the job 'unobtrusively' to the point of enlisting the aid of persons whose aid would
amount to trespass ..... the requirement that he [the judge] separately sanction each
surreptitious entry . . . . can hardly be due to congressional oversight." 564 F.2d at 643-44.
Judge Gurfein also concluded that the fourth amendment requirements are satisfied by a
Title III order that does not expressly authorize covert entries, stating that:
The orders here [in question] do conform precisely to the requirements of the
Fourth Amendment as well as to those of § 2518. They particularly describe the premises
to be "searched." They state that there is probable cause to believe that particular oral
conversations of named persons and others concerning the specified offenses will be
obtained through the interception at the named premises which, there is probable cause
to believe, are being used for commission of the named offenses. "Prompt" execution of
the authorization is ordered, and the interception is limited not only in time but to
occasions when at least one of the named subjects is present.
Id. at 644 (emphasis supplied by court). In addition, he noted that although Berger involved
a surreptitious entry, the Supreme Court did not mention it as a separate constitutional
problem. He conceded that the dissent was correct in concluding that covert entries incident
to electronic surveillance might be dangerous, but argued that law enforcement agents are
[Vol. 31:10551064
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IV. COMMENT
The instant decisions represent the first federal appellate court
attempts to determine whether covert entries to install electronic
listening devices are implicitly authorized in Title I orders provid-
ing only for the interception of communications." The analysis
adopted by the Second Circuit in Scafidi has little to commend it.
The court subjectively concluded that the "most reasonable inter-
pretation" of a Title III intercept order is that it implicitly author-
izes law enforcement officials to enter private premises to install
listening devices." The court sought to buttress this conclusion by
emphasizing both the practical problems it found inherent in sepa-
rate authorization " and Title HI's failure to expressly require that
covert entries be separately authorized. 4 This "common sense"75
approach in effect treats resolution of the issue of implicit authori-
zation as a mere exercise in statutory interpretation. Although Title
Ill's provisions governing the issuance of intercept orders arguably
may be construed to permit covert entries to install listening devices
without express judicial authorization, the Scafidi approach ignores
a vital threshold issue that must be resolved prior to any interpreta-
tion of congressional intent-whether the fourth amendment itself
permits implicit authorization of covert entries. The drafters of
Title I sought to embody in a comprehensive statute the fourth
amendment's protection against unreasonable intrusions into the
privacy of oral communications articulated by the Supreme Court
in Berger and Katz." As the Ford court properly recognized, how-
ever, the fourth amendment provides no less protection against un-
better able to evaluate the risks inherent in effecting interceptions than are judges. Although
Judge Gurfein rejected the necessity of separate authorization for a covert entry, he suggested
that judges make such an express authorization until the Supreme Court speaks on the issue.
Judge Smith dissented from the majority opinion. Id. at 645. He stressed that the differ-
ent methods of planting listening devices entail varying degrees of danger and that in some
instances a trespassory entry might not be required. He thus concluded that a judge should
be required to pass on the method used to effect electronic surveillance.
71. See note 65 supra and accompanying text.
72. See note 66 supra and accompanying text.
73. See notes 68-69 supra and accompanying text.
74. See text accompanying note 67 supra.
75. That the court is addressing the issue of the necessity of separate authorization from
what it sees as a "common sense" point of view is obvious from the language used in the
opinion. Not only does the court speak of "the most reasonable interpretation" of a Title III
intercept order, see text accompanying note 72 supra, but it also includes such conclusory
statements as "[and such placing will have to be surreptitious, for no self-respecting police
officer would openly seek permission from the person to be surveilled to install a 'bug' to
intercept his conversations," and "[i]t would be highly naive to impute to a district judge a
belief that the device required to effect his bugging authorization did not require installa-
tion." 564 F.2d at 640.
76. See text accompanying note 41 supra.
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reasonable intrusion into private premises.7 Thus, even if Scafidi is
correct in asserting that a Title III intercept order implicitly author-
izes incidental covert entries, such an implicit authorization none-
theless must withstand constitutional scrutiny.
Ford, in contrast to Scafidi, focuses on the issue whether im-
plicit authorization of covert entries is constitutionally permissible"
and correctly concludes that the fourth amendment requires sepa-
rate authorization in order to protect private premises from unrea-
sonable physical intrusions. A covert entry pursuant to a Title III
intercept order that merely authorizes the interception of communi-
cations is analogous to a general search warrant" because it places
unfettered discretion in law enforcement officials to decide on the
manner of entry and the scope of the search undertaken in locating
a suitable place to install an authorized listening device. Law en-
forcement officials thus conceivably might rummage the entire
premises under the guise of installing or relocating such devices,"
and in the course of their search might seize personal papers and
effects discovered in "plain view," which presumably would be
admissible at trial.8 Moreover, an intercept order lacking express
authorization of limited covert entries might be employed as a pre-
text to search for tangible evidence in cases when the government
is able to meet the probable cause requirements for issuance of an
intercept order, but cannot make a showing of probable cause suffi-
cient to obtain a warrant to search for tangible evidence.2 Like
77. As noted by the court in Ford, the Katz decision expanded, not diminished, the
scope of fourth amendment protection. See notes 49-50 supra and accompanying text.
78. See notes 47-59 supra and accompanying text.
79. See notes 34-35 supra and accompanying text. But see 564 F.2d at 644 (Gurfein, J.,
concurring) ("the order is detailed enough to defeat any realistic claim that it is a 'general
warrant' ").
80. This type of "rummaging" was noted by the court in Ford. 553 F.2d at 158. The
potential for police abuse of the plain view doctrine in this context was also recognized in 57
B.U. L. REv. 587, 601-02 (1977). See note 65 supra.
81. See notes 32-33 supra and accompanying text.
82. This abuse of "pretextual searches" was recognized in 57 B.U. L. REv. 587, 601-02
(1977). While the probable cause requirements for obtaining an intercept order and for ob-
taining a search warrant for tangible evidence may be essentially equivalent where both are
requested to facilitate investigation of the same criminal activity, the requirements may vary
when different crimes are involved. For example, law enforcement officials may possess
sufficient evidence to demonstrate probable cause that drugs are being transported across
state lines and thus may be able to obtain a Title III warrant to intercept communications
related to the drug operation. In addition the law enforcement officials may suspect that the
same parties are harboring stolen goods in a given location but have insufficient evidence to
obtain a search warrant for the purpose of seizing that tangible evidence. If in such a case
the officers may obtain an intercept order that in effect constitutes implicit authorization to
make covert entries incident to the surveillance, they may fashion the manner of entry to
maximize their chances of encountering the suspected goods. Of course, if the officers have
sufficient evidence to obtain an intercept order, they may also be able to obtain separate
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searches made under the guise of locating a proper place to install
a listening device, pretextual searches conflict with Supreme Court
decisions requiring that warrants be particularized as to the place
to be searched and the evidence to be seized.
Implicit authorization of covert entries is also inconsistent with
the constitutional requirement that oral evidence be gathered in
such a manner as to minimize intrusions into private premises. This
"least intrusive means" requirement, articulated in Berger 3 and
implicit in Katz, attempts to minimize the distinct invasion of pri-
vacy that results from an entry incident to an oral interception,8 4
and may frequently require that conversations be intercepted by
means of wiretaps, which can be effected without physical trespass,
rather than by the installation of listening devices on private prem-
ises."' If, however, the authorizing judge determines that a listening
device must be employed to intercept communications, he still must
ensure that the physical intrusion necessary to install the device be
minimized to the greatest extent possible. 6 An implicit authoriza-
tion, which necessarily places no limitation on the number of de-
vices to be installed or upon their location within the premises, does
authorization to make entries, assuming the surveillance cannot be accomplished by less
intrusive nontrespassory means. In issuing separate authorization, however, a judge presuma-
bly will place reasonable restrictions on the manner and scope of entry. Thus excessive
discretionary power in law enforcement officials will be avoided and the possibility of abuse
will be reduced to a minimum.
83. See text accompanying note 39 supra.
84. The Ford court also found the least intrusive means doctrine implicit in United
States v. United States District Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297 (1972):
Contrary to the Government's contention, the Fourth Amendment's protections against
physical trespass do not disappear simply because a probable cause showing has been
made, and statutory authorization received, for gathering oral evidence. Quite the con-
trary, the least intrusive means rationale implicit in Katz and Keith requires that, where
possible, such evidence should be gathered without entering private premises and that
where entry is required the judicial authorization therefor should circumscribe that entry
to the need shown.
553 F.2d at 158; see note 49 supra and accompanying text.
85. The author of 57 B.U. L. Rav. 587, 605-06 (1977) concludes that a nontrespassory
wiretap is required under the least intrusive means doctrine unless it would be inadequate:
Accordingly, the "least intrusive means" test compels that courts consider as prima facie
unreasonable a government request to break and enter private premises in order to
install a bug-a presumption that should be rebuttable only by a government proffer of
evidence demonstrating that a conventional wiretap would be ineffective . . . . [1]n
the context of electronic surveillance, it is not unfair or burdensome to require a pre-
liminary showing that no less intrusive means is available. First, the problem of timing
is not as critical as it may be in searches for tangible evidence because the evidence-
words-is incapable of being removed or destroyed. Second, a "least intrusive means"
requirement does not pose any threat to the searching officers because a wiretap can be
implemented with little or-no danger-a striking contrast to the dangers attending a
forcible entry into a suspect's home or office.
86. See notes 79 & 84 supra and accompanying text.
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nothing to limit physical intrusions. Separate authorization, in con-
trast, provides some assurance that the interception will be effected
by the least intrusive means possible because it requires the author-
izing judge to limit the scope and manner of entry as the circum-
stances dictate.
The potential for police abuse during covert entries coupled
with the policy expressed in Berger and Katz of minimizing physical
intrusions mandates that requests for authorizations of covert en-
tries to install listening devices be considered carefully by the au-
thorizing judge. Ford correctly grants broad discretion to the au-
thorizing judge to establish necessary restrictions .8 Discretion is
desirable because of the impossibility of establishing immutable
warrant requirements to cover the variety of circumstances in which
the interception of communications may be conducted. For exam-
ple, a bomb scare ruse like that in Ford may be appropriate when a
nocturnal breaking and entering is impossible because the premises
in which the listening device is to be installed is a commercial
operation that either remains open continuously or employs armed
guards during hours in which the establishment is closed. If the
conversations are to be intercepted in a nursing home, however, a
bomb scare ruse may endanger the safety of elderly occupants, while
a nocturnal entry would pose no such hazards. Because of the vary-
ing circumstances from case to case, separate authorization may
render the task of the authorizing judge uncertain and time consum-
ing. The fourth amendment nevertheless requires that an intercept
order expressly authorizing law enforcement officials to enter prem-
ises to install electronic surveillance devices be predicated on
thoughtful, independent consideration of an individual's justifiable
expectation that his home or his business will be free from unreason-
able governmental intrusion.
DANIEL PAUL SMITH
87. The court in affirming the judgment of the district court held that a judge must
limit the time, manner, and number of entries if the warrant is not to be deemed overly broad.
See notes 44 & 58 supra and accompanying text. Under Ford, therefore, the Title III warrant
upheld in Agrusa would be invalid. See note 65 supra. The court also stated that a judge
should specify in the warrant the extent to which the executing officers may be armed. 553
F.2d at 165 n.58.
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Constitutional Law-Criminal
Procedure-Custodial Suspect's Admissions After
Assertion and Subsequent Waiver of Right to
Counsel Are Not Per Se Excluded in Absence of
Coercion
I. FACTS AND HOLDING
Appellant, convicted in federal district court' of an offense aris-
ing from transportation of marijuana, claimed that the admission
at trial of incriminating statements he made after requesting the
assistance of an attorney2 violated his sixth amendment right to
counsel.' The government argued that appellant had waived his
right to counsel in response to a question asked by an officer who
sought to determine whether appellant actually had asserted that
right.' The trial court admitted the incriminating statements into
evidence. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals sitting en
banc, held, affirmed. Uncoerced incriminating statements are not
per se excluded at trial when a custodial suspect asserts but subse-
quently waives his sixth amendment right to counsel in response to
a question seeking clarification of his assertion of that right. United
States v. Rodriguez-Gastelum, 569 F.2d 482 (9th Cir. 1978).
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination' and
the sixth amendment right to the assistance of counsel6 provide vital
protections for suspected criminals. The Supreme Court consis-
tently has interpreted the privilege against self-incrimination to
1. Appellant was convicted in the United States District Court for the District of Ari-
zona, William C. Frey, J.
2. Authorities informed appellant of his Miranda rights after arresting him and taking
him into custody. When asked to discuss his possession of the marijuana appellant responded:
"Okay, okay, but with an attorney." United States v. Rodriquez-Gastelum, 569 F.2d 482 (9th
Cir. 1978).
3. The sixth amendment guarantees any person accused of a crime the right "to have
the Assistance of Counsel for his defense." U.S. CONST. amend. VI. In particular, appellant
contended that his Miranda rights had been violated. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966); notes 11-16 infra and accompanying text.
4. The government contended that because the officer was not certain that appellant
had invoked his sixth amendment right, the officer asked the subsequent question, "Do you
want to talk to me now without any attorney?" The appellant answered, "That's fine," and
then made incriminating statements. 569 F.2d at 483-84.
5. The fifth amendment provides that "[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself ...... U.S. CONST. amend. V.
6. See note 3 supra.
1978] 1069
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:1055
require the exclusion at trial of a defendant's involuntary confes-
sions7 and has extended the right to counsel beyond the formal trial
of the accused.' Moreover, the fifth and sixth amendments interact
to protect criminal suspects:9 unless he fully understands the legal
implications of his statements, a suspect may fail to utilize his
privilege against self-incrimination. The assistance of counsel is es-
sential to prevent unknowing self-incrimination.'"
To preserve these rights, the Supreme Court established spe-
cific standards for police conduct in the landmark case of Miranda
v. Arizona." Miranda strengthened the fifth amendment privilege
by requiring that law enforcement officials inform custodial sus-
pects that they may remain silent, and that anything they say may
be used against them in court.'2 To effectuate the sixth amendment
right to counsel, Miranda also held that officials must inform sus-
pects that they may have an attorney present during questioning.'3
The Court explicitly prescribed required police procedure: "[i]f the
individual states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must
cease until an attorney is present. At that time, the individual must
7. The privilege against coerced self-incrimination was established in Brown v. Missis-
sippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936), in which the Supreme Court held that confessions obtained by
violence violated due process. In Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940), the Court stated
that our accusatory system of criminal justice demands that the government produce evi-
dence against an individual by its own independent labors, rather than compelling it from
the mouth of the accused. The privilege guarantees the accused the right "to remain silent
unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will. . . ." Malloy v. Hogan,
378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964). See Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964); Massiah v. United States,
377 U.S. 201 (1964); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959).
8. The sixth amendment specifically guarantees a criminal defendant the right to have
the assistance of counsel during a federal criminal trial. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Supreme
Court has extended this right beyond the trial itself in a series of cases: Powell v. Alabama,
287 U.S. 45 (1932) (counsel must be allowed at every "critical stage" in the proceedings);
Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961) (pretrial arraignment); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335 (1963) (applies to the states through the fourteenth amendment); Douglas v. Califor-
nia, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (counsel must be provided for indigents during appeals of right);
Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964) (interrogation of indicted defendants); United
States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (pretrial identification procedures); Coleman v. Ala-
bama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970) (preliminary hearings); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972)
(counsel must be provided for indigents on trial for any offense potentially resulting in
incarceration).
9. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478
(1964); Messiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315
(1959).
10. See, e.g., Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), in which the accused did not
know that admission of complicity was legally as damaging as admission of the entire act
itself.
11. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The Court held that the defendant's involuntary confession
should have been excluded at trial. Id. at 479.
12. Id. at 469.
13. Id. at 471.
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have an opportunity to confer with an attorney." 4 The Court's opin-
ion was based upon two express assumptions: first, that all custodial
interrogations are inherently coercive, and second, that removal of
this coercive nature requires adequate warnings to the suspect.,' If
police fail to comply with these rules, all evidence subsequently
obtained must be excluded at trial.'" Miranda thus created a per se
exclusionary rule that mandates the suppression of illegally ob-
tained evidence.
Although Miranda explicitly outlined the procedural require-
ments for protecting a suspect's rights, the decision left uncertain
the proper standard for determining when those rights are effec-
tively waived. The Court stated that waiver would not be presumed
from either silence or the successful elicitation of a suspect's state-
ment and also placed a "heavy burden" on the government to show
that the accused "knowingly and intelligently waived" his rights. 7
The standard for determining a waiver of the right to counsel, stated
initially in Johnson v. Zerbst" and reaffirmed after Miranda by
Brewer v. Williams,' requires an "intentional relinquishment of a
known right" by the accused. This determination depends on the
specific facts of each case.20
Recent decisions have significantly limited the scope of the
Miranda doctrine.2' In Michigan v. Tucker,22 police warned the sus-
pect of his right to counsel before questioning began, but did not
inform him that counsel would be appointed for him if he could not
afford to retain one. The Court refused to exclude a subsequent
incriminating statement, finding that this minor violation did not
render the statement involuntary: a bad faith violation or flagrant
misconduct was necessary to invoke the per se exclusionary rule.2
The Tucker Court viewed the exclusionary rule of Miranda not as a
constitutional principle, but only as a sanction designed to deter
willful police misconduct. 24
14. Id. at 474.
15. Id. at 444.
16. Id. at 474.
17. Id. at 475.
18. 304 U.S. 458 (1937).
19. 430 U.S. 387 (1977). See text accompanying notes 28-31 infra.
20. 304 U.S. at 464.
21. In Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971), the Court allowed the use of oral and
written statements obtained in violation of Miranda for the impeachment of a criminal
defendant who took the witness stand in his own behalf. This case was the first indication of
the trend toward limiting Miranda.
22. 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
23. See id. at 446.
24. See id. at 440.
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In Michigan v. Mosley,25 the Court required that, after a sus-
pect has asserted his fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination, the police must fully respect and "scrupulously
honor" the suspect's "right to cut off the questioning."" The Mosley
Court followed the rationale in Tucker, however, in holding that the
suspect's constitutional rights were not violated when a different
officer, after repeating the Miranda warnings, interrogated the sus-
pect about a different crime two hours after the privilege had been
invoked. 7 Justice White, in concurrence, explicitly distinguished
Mosley from the situation arising when a suspect asserts the sixth
amendment right to counsel.2s In Brewer v. Williams,"' which pre-
sented such a sixth amendment case, the Court distinguished the
less egregious violations in Tucker and Mosley and reversed a con-
viction based on a "clear violation" of the Miranda rules." In addi-
tion to implementing the Johnson v. Zerbst" "intentional relin-
quishment" test for waiver of the right to counsel, the Court af-
firmed the distinction between the privilege against self-
incrimination and the right to counsel.12 The Brewer Court also
expressly refused to review the Miranda doctrine.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently considered two
cases raising important questions concerning the right to counsel.
In United States v. Pheaster4 the suspect requested an attorney and
refused to answer questions after officials gave the Miranda warn-
25. 423 U.S. 96 (1975).
26. Id. at 103.
27. Id. The opinion emphasized that the subsequent interrogation did not constitute
repeated efforts to wear down the suspect's resistance, and stated that Miranda did not
require a per se proscription upon further questioning of indefinite duration once the suspect
asserts his rights to silence.
28. "[The reasons to keep the lines of communications between the authorities and
the accused open when the accused has chosen to make his own decisions are not present
when he indicates instead that he wishes legal advice with respect thereto." Id. at 110 n.2
(White, J., concurring in result).
29. 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
30. The suspect's attorneys and police had agreed that the suspect would not be interro-
gated during a car trip with police. During the trip, the police appealed to the suspect's
religious convictions, and the suspect led them to the body of the victim.
31. 304 U.S. 458 (1937). See text accompanying note 18 supra.
32. 430 U.S. at 397-98.
33. Twenty-two states urged the Court to re-examine and overrule the procedural ruling
in Miranda. 430 U.S. at 424. Despite the Court's unwillingness to re-examine the ruling in
Miranda, it has continued to define restrictively the scope of Miranda's holding. See United
States v. Wong, 97 S. Ct. 1823 (1977) (warnings are not required in subsequent prosecution
for perjury); United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564 (1976) (Miranda does not apply to
grand jury proceedings); Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341 (1976) (IRS investigators
do not have to comply with Miranda when the suspect is not in custody).
34. 544 F.2d 353 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied sub nom., Inciso v. United States, 429 U.S.
1099 (1977).
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ings. After a recitation of the evidence against him and repeated
requests for the location of the victim by officials, however, the
suspect admitted complicity." The court affirmed the conviction,
based on a distinction between interrogation of a suspect and the
presentation of evidence to that suspect."6 In United States v.
Flores-Calvillo, 3 facts very similar to those in Pheaster resulted in
exclusion of the evidence on initial hearing before the circuit courtss
The court, however, delayed issuance of the mandate and action on
a petition for rehearing until disposition of the instant case, which
gave the Ninth Circuit an opportunity to reconcile the inconsistent
decisions in Pheaster and Flores-Calvillo.
III. THE INSTANT DECISION
The circuit court, rejecting the application of a per se exclusion-
ary rule in sixth amendment cases, characterized the interrogating
officer's question as noncoercive and intended only to clarify appel-
lant's prior statement." Although the court could not agree whether
appellant's words effectively invoked his fifth and sixth amendment
rights, 0 it found resolution of that issue unnecessary because the
appellant's subsequent agreement to talk effectively waived those
rights."' The court based the finding of a waiver on the
"relinquishment of a known right" standard expressed in Johnson
and Brewer.2 The court applied this standard, however, with flexi-
bility according to the circumstances of each case,4" reasoning that
strict application of the test would effect a return to the per se
exclusionary rule it had initially rejected."4 Advancing several rea-
sons for rejecting the per se exclusionary test, the court first argued
that a per se rule would deprive suspects the opportunity to make
35. Upon hearing that a fingerprint on one of the kidnap notes had been positively
identified as his, the defendant admitted his complicity in the crime. 544 F.2d at 368.
36. Although the court never expressly found an implied waiver, the opinion stated that
a waiver resulted from the defendant's response to the presentation of the evidence. The
defendant, however, never expressly waived the right to counsel, and the decision implies that
a similar response to an interrogation, rather than to a presentation of evidence, would not
have resulted in a waiver. Id. at 366-68.
37. 19 CmM. L. Rzp. (BNA) 2405 (9th Cir. 1976) (petition for rehearing pending). After
asserting her right to counsel, the defendant in Flores-Calvillo subsequently agreed to talk
to officials.
38. The court expressly adopted the distinction between the right to silence and the
right to counsel contained in Mosley and Brewer.
39. United States v. Rodriquez-Gastelum, 569 F.2d 482, 484 (9th Cir. 1978).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 488. See notes 18 and 28 supra and accompanying text.
43. 569 F.2d at 488.
44. Id.
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their own assessments and to exercise independent judgment- Sim-
ilarly, the court asserted that a per se rule could "imprison" a per-
son in his privileges by creating a situation where a suspect could
never relinquish his rights even if he so desired.46 Finally, a per se
rule, in the majority's opinion, unnecessarily threatened effective
enforcement of the law.
47
Judge Hufstedler maintained in dissent48 that the explicit lan-
guage in Miranda requiring the cessation of questioning upon a
suspect's request for an attorney and the reaffirmance of that lan-
guage in Brewer mandated suppression of the evidence in question.4
The dissent additionally found Mosley inapplicable because it had
expressly distinguished waiver of the right to counsel from waiver
of the privilege against self-incrimination. Arguing that the appel-
lant, having initially requested counsel, could not waive that right
until he had consulted with an attorney, the dissent viewed the
instant case as a routine Miranda violation requiring exclusion of
the incriminating statements. 1
IV. COMMENT
The instant decision follows the recent series of Supreme Court
cases that have construed Miranda as establishing only a set of
judicially created rules of evidence, and not a constitutional doc-
trine. 2 The Supreme Court implicitly has rejected the basic
Miranda assumption that all custodial interrogations are inherently
coercive by distinguishing between flagrant violations requiring ex-
clusion of the evidence at trial and minor violations which do not
deprive suspects of their constitutional rights.53 When viewed in this
developing framework, the result in the instant case is predictable."
The court found only a minor violation of the Miranda rules and
therefore did not require exclusion of the incriminating evidence.
Although relying heavily on the Supreme Court decision in
Mosley, the instant court completely discounts'the crucial distinc-
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Judge Ely joined Judge Hufstedler in his dissent; Judge Goodwin, joined by Judges
Browning and Anderson, concurred with the court's rejection of the per se rule, but found no
waiver by the appellant. Id. at 488-91.
49. Id. at 489.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 490.
52. See notes 21-23 supra and accompanying text.
53. See text accompanying notes 22-28 supra.
54. See Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974); Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96
(1975).
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tion between the privilege against self-incrimination and the right
to counsel," which was expressly acknowledged in both Mosley and
Brewer." When a suspect asserts the right to silence, the implication
arises that he is satisfied to rely on his own judgment and chooses
to make his own decisions. When a suspect requests the assistance
of counsel, however, he concedes that he is incompetent to deal with
the authorities alone: to exercise intelligent judgment, he needs an
attorney's help. Once a suspect requests an attorney, questioning
must be discontinued. 5 Any subsequent waiver by the suspect be-
fore conferring with an attorney should be viewed as the result of
the same incompetence that initially led him to seek legal counsel.
The right to counsel, once asserted, thus requires more rigid protec-
tion than the right to silence.
The instant opinion ultimately rests on the finding that appel-
lant effectively waived his right to counsel. Although purporting to
use the Johnson v. Zerbst standard for testing the validity of a
waiver," the opinion never expressly applies that test to the facts.
The court summarily states that the "intentional relinquishment"
standard is satisfied." Yet the confusion apparent in appellant's
conduct and statements forcefully rebuts any assertion that he
knowingly and intelligently waived his rights. Miranda requires an
officer to insure that the suspect fully understands his rights and
privileges before interrogation." Once reasonably alerted to a sus-
pect's confusion or misapprehension, an officer should be required
to presume against waiver and discontinue questioning." The in-
stant court utilized the somewhat circular argument that a
"flexible" application of the waiver test is necessary to prevent a
return to the per se exclusionary rule. When the per se rule is re-
jected, however, a strict application of the waiver test remains as
the only effective protection of a suspect's rights. "Flexible" appli-
cation unjustifiably relieves the "heavy burden" that Miranda
places on the government and negates the strict requirement of an
intelligent and knowing waiver.
The holding in this case carries the trend toward reinterpreta-
55. See note 28 supra. Justice White's footnote was cited in the Court's opinion in
Brewer also. 430 U.S. at 436 n.10.
56. See text accompanying notes 28 and 33 supra.
57. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 474 (1966).
58. See text accompanying note 18 supra.
59. 569 F.2d 482, 488 (9th Cir. 1978).
60. See text accompanying notes 11-16 supra.
61. See generally, United States v. Tafoya, 459 F.2d 424 (10th Cir. 1972); United States
v. Speaks, 453 F.2d 966 (1st Cir. 1972); United States v. Jenkins, 440 F.2d 574 (7th Cir. 1971);
United States v. Nielsen, 392 F.2d 849 (7th Cir. 1968).
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tion of Miranda to an undesirable extreme. Although the rejection
of the per se rule will diminish the number of reversals of factually
correct convictions, relegating the protection of the right to counsel
to the same analysis employed in right to silence cases operates an
injustice on criminal suspects. The request for an attorney should
trigger greater protection because every effort should be made to
insure that the suspect exercises his judgment intelligently. Despite
the Supreme Court's retrenchment from the Miranda assumption
that all custodial interrogations are inherently coercive, coercion
remains a problem, especially where a suspect is confused or unable
to exercise his rights intelligently. Thus implementation of a strict
waiver test is necessary to secure a suspect's rights in the absence
of the per se rule.
R. MicHAEL MOORE
